Another reason people have refrained from talking about the weaponisation of space is because there is no clear definition of what constitutes a space weapon. That is probably why the Pentagon vaguely refers to “kinetic and non-kinetic means to affect adversary capabilities”, without spelling out specific details.

In simple terms, counter-space technology falls into four categories: co-orbital weapons match the target satellite’s orbit, track it closely, and disable it through impact or explosion; direct-ascent weapons strike passing satellites without entering their orbits; directed-energy tools, such as lasers and high-power microwaves, cripple satellite functions in an instant; electronic and cyber tools jam signals or hack both satellite and ground systems.

And a major grey zone still exists – systems that have a civilian purpose can be used for military purposes. For example, an ordinary satellite can instantly turn into an offensive weapon if it extends a robotic arm to seize other spacecraft.

Two opposing views now dominate global space security debates: no weaponisation vs responsible behaviour. For nearly two decades, China, Russia and many Global South countries have called for a legally binding treaty to ban space weaponisation entirely.

The US-led Western bloc, however, argues that space militarisation is inevitable, so the world should instead focus on establishing non-binding “responsible behaviours”. In other words, it is impossible to empty a busy road of all traffic, but rules can still be set to prevent crashes.

China is not against the idea of “responsible behaviours”. In 2021, two SpaceX Starlink satellites – Starlink-1095 in July and Starlink-2305 in October – made dangerously close approaches to China’s space station while Chinese astronauts were on board. Unexpected orbital shifts forced the station to execute emergency collision-avoidance manoeuvres. If ordinary commercial satellites can create such severe risks, dedicated space weapons would only amplify these dangers exponentially.